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In 1119 King Baldwin II of Jerusalem granted nine French knights space on the Temple Mount 
over the ruins of Solomon’s Temple to create the headquarters of a new monastic order: The Poor 
Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon, or the Knights Templar. They grew in 
wealth and power and became an influential and pervasive organization throughout Western 
Europe until King Philip of France suppressed them in 1307. The Templars were only one of a 
number of Christian holy orders of “warrior monks” founded after the First Crusade, with more 
than two-dozen others founded in Syria, Central and Eastern Europe, and Iberia. More importantly 
for this paper, the Templars are one example of what we label “warrior elites.” Our definition of 
warrior elites is not precise but includes pre-industrial full-time specialized soldiers that represent 
a relatively small part of a region’s military forces but possess disproportionate military strength. 
In addition, warrior elites often possess significant political and social power. This paper explores 
the extent to which warrior elites have two characteristics: they adopt a special religion, either 
different from the mainstream religion or a unique adaptation of the mainstream religion, and the 
special religion has provisions that enforce property rights. To the extent warrior elites have these 
two characteristics, we hypothesize they are an example of a social institution that evolves as a 
low-cost alternative to government and to ordinary religion as a method of property rights 
enforcement.  
 
                                                
† We very much thank Frederick Bold for contributions to earlier drafts. We also thank 
participants at the meetings of the Missouri Valley Economic Association for their contributions. 
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In 1119 C.E., King Baldwin II of Jerusalem granted nine French knights space in 
the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount over the ruins of Solomon’s Temple 
to create the headquarters of a new monastic order: The Poor Fellow-Soldiers of 
Christ and of the Temple of Solomon (Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique 
Solomonici). The Knights Templar, or Templars, as they have become known, 
grew after that modest beginning to become a powerful, wealthy, and pervasive 
organization throughout Western Europe. 
More importantly for this paper, the Templars are one example of what we 
label “warrior elites.” Our definition of warrior elites is not precise but is intended 
to focus on full-time preindustrial specialized soldiers that represent a relatively 
small part of a region’s military forces but possess disproportionate military 
strength. In addition, warrior elites possess significant political and social power. 
We restrict the definition to warriors before the emergence of modern centralized 
governments. 
This paper explores the extent to which warrior elites have two characteristics: 
they adopt a special religion, either different from the mainstream religion or a 
unique adaptation of the mainstream religion, and the special religion has 
doctrinal provisions which enforce property rights. To the extent warrior elites 
have these two characteristics, we hypothesize they are an example of a social 
institution that evolves as a low-cost alternative to both government and to 
ordinary religion as a method of property rights enforcement. Our argument can 
be viewed as similar to Avner Greif’s (1989, 1993) work on Maghribi traders—
Jewish merchants who worked outside the protection of government-enforceable 
contracts. Using religion as a method of property right enforcement has also been 
explored by Peter Leeson (2012) in medieval use of ordeals. 
Beyond property rights enforcement (the focus here), military orders also 
provided other public goods and services. The Templars gave to the needy and 
required commanders to give a tenth of their bread to the poor. The Orders of St. 
Thomas of Acre, St. Lazarus, the Teutonic Knights, and the Hospitallers all began 
as medical establishments, with the Order of St. Lazarus focusing on leprosy. The 
Order of Santiago helped ransom the kidnapped, as did the Teutonic Knights, the 
Order of the Most Holy Trinity for the Redemption of the Captives, the Order of 
the Blessed Virgin Mary of Mercy, the Order of Calatrava, and the Order of 
Santiago. Tens of thousands of pilgrims received assistance from military orders 
beyond medical aid and ransoming, including military support, transport, and 
escorted visits (Morton, 2013: 87, 109, 120, 126). 
The emergence of warrior elites in Europe coincided with the crusades. 
Warrior monks mostly came into being to battle Muslims in the Holy Land and 
Iberia, as well as pagans in northern Europe. In their recruitment, warrior elites 
would face adverse selection. Orders gained power that spanned Europe and into 
Asia with vast land holdings and riches. To mitigate inferior or opportunistic 
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warriors from joining, thereby making the group weaker on average, religiously 
specific and demanding qualifications were required. Common requirements were 
vows of celibacy and poverty, additional to the requirement of being of noble 
birth.  
Kings who employed warrior elites had to deal with moral hazard—after 
gaining power the new warrior class could turn against the king and supplant 
them. Indeed, the Teutonic Knights became the government in the Baltic areas 
they conquered. Individual vows of poverty decreased this possibility; an 
individual warrior monk did not own a castle, but rather it belonged to the order, 
thereby separating the riches of the organization from the individual. While this 
practice clearly did not fully eliminate the issue, it did separate the warriors from 
their wealth to some extent.  
Although we focus on the benefit of warrior elites to the larger society, an 
obvious question is why would an individual join an organization with such strict 
and demanding standards? The strictness is valuable to society, but how is it 
valuable to the individual member? 
We offer three complementary explanations. First, members gain wealth and 
the status associated with being elite. Individual poverty is a requirement but does 
not forbid shared collective wealth. Closely related, members gain security in the 
form of income over time, just as insurance annuities function today.  
Second, a warrior’s success and even survival in battle depends on the 
commitment of the other warriors in the group. A single charging lancer is 
powerful; a thousand united charging lancers are an awesome force. Here the 
group cannot afford a free rider (pun intended). The same holds true (albeit less 
dramatically) for other collective activities in which members might engage. 
Iannaccone (1992) demonstrates convincingly how the “sacrifice and stigma” 
associated with religious cult membership strengthens the group and benefits its 
members, and religious warrior elites certainly have cult-like characteristics. 
Third, we cannot dismiss or underestimate the value of religion itself. For 
Stark and Bainbridge (1987), religion provides “general compensators,” an 
intellectual abstraction describing something of immense value to many. Further, 
the value of religion to an individual increases if others share that religion. One’s 
faith strengthens when others have that same faith. Economists describe the latter 
as “network externality,” present in modern day phenomenon like social media, 
where a person gains if others are also active (Church and Gandal 1992). 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RELIGION 
 
A substantial body of literature has drawn attention to the role of property 
rights in the level and direction of economic development and activity, property 
rights being broadly defined as the right to use, earn income from, and transfer a 
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good. Early examples of this literature include classic work by Coase (1937), 
Demsetz (1967), and Alchian and Demsetz (1973). Well-defined property rights 
in turn reduce transaction costs, encouraging economic activity. Menard (2004) 
provides a comprehensive overview of the property rights and transaction costs 
literature. Allen (1995) extends this work to the church, noting especially that 
Catholic Church doctrine evolved to encourage priestly financial honesty.   
Other work argues that religious institutions and doctrine can serve as 
alternatives to family, community, and government in defining and protecting 
property rights (Hull and Bold 1989, 1994). Fukuyama (1995) makes a similar 
argument. In fact, the historical prevalence of religion may reflect its secular role 
as a low cost instrument for defining and enforcing property rights. The basic 
rationale is that if a populace believes adherence to or violations of an established 
set of rules will result in some sort of divine reward or punishment, people will 
tend to follow those rules. The symbiotic relationship between a society and a 
religion will direct religions toward such things as non-salvageable, quality-
assuring capital including large religious structures, priestly garb, and unique 
icons. Further, the religion’s doctrines about the afterlife in general and about 
rewards for good behavior or punishment for bad behavior after death will change 
in predictable ways as religion is more or less important in property rights 
enforcement. Religion’s temporal reward and punishment structure will follow a 
similar pattern. Research focusing on the High Middle Ages supports the 
argument (Clegg and Reed 1994; Hull 1989). 
It is clear that other property rights enforcement methods, notably 
government-produced coercion, can and do coexist with religion. This paper 
explores the interplay between religion and government coercion as alternative 
institutional tools for enforcing property rights. This framework suggests a 
possible societal path. A more localized society possessing an effective religion 
experiences economic growth because it has a defined and divinely enforced 
property rights system. With increased wealth and trade, growth takes two forms. 
There is a transition to greater specialization and trade with other societies as well 
as geographic expansion, which pushes the geographic extent of the society 
outward. In both instances there is contact with people who may be less inclined 
to follow the religion-based property rights system. In other words, a society with 
a successful religion-based property rights system may have an inherent tendency 
to evolve to one in which religion plays a declining relative role and institutions 
for coercive enforcement become increasingly important. 
Note that a substantial literature focuses on the rent-seeking behavior of 
religious organizations, following from the assumption of profit maximization 
(Anderson et al., 1992; Ekelund et al., 1996). This hypothesis need not compete 
with ours. Profit maximization is not inconsistent with production of valuable 
products. 
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RISE OF EUROPEAN WARRIOR ELITES 
 
As mentioned above, military orders arose in Europe during the time of the 
crusades. European kings used warrior elites during the crusades as a way to 
expand their control into enemy occupied territory. With limited fiscal capacity, 
weak governments outsourced military activities to organizations outside of full 
state control. With kings lacking a standing army of their own, religious military 
orders offered an attractive alternative. Monks could spread their religion and gain 
adherents, whereas kings cheaply acquired troops to expand territory.  
The orders were concentrated in Iberia, the Holy Land, and the Baltic areas, 
all regions where Christian kings had little to no power. Table 1 is a (non-
comprehensive) list of military orders that arose in Europe beginning in the 11th 
century. Various orders merged with others, and some were short lived, but the 
table gives an idea of where these orders operated. Of the twenty-seven orders 
listed, three were in the Baltics, three in Portugal, and eight in Spain. Five others 
began in the Holy Land and later expanded. Of the remaining eight, the 
Hungarian order fought the Ottomans. Three French orders existed, with two in 
southern France where crusades were held. The French king at this time did not 
control what is now the south of France, and these orders could function as a 
substitute army. The other French order (Order of Aubrac) protected pilgrims, or 
those who travelled in areas with weak to no property right protection. At least 
four Italian orders existed, with one (Order of Saint Stephen Pope and Martyr) 
designed to fight against the Turks and pirates that disrupted Mediterranean trade. 
The Militia of Jesus Christ fought against the Cathars and Waldensians and the 
Order of the Blessed Virgin Mary was organized to deal with unrest in Lombardy. 
The last order, the Order of Saint James of Altopascio, protected pilgrims, similar 
to the Order of Aubrac in France.  
All of these European military orders operated near regions where the 
Christian king was weak or lacked power. They filled a useful void not just in 
military might but also in protection of kidnap victims, pilgrims, the sick, and the 
poor, thereby improving and maintaining property rights for Christians.  
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Table 1: European Military Orders 
 
Military Order Location 
Livonian Brothers of the Sword Baltic 
Order of Dobrzyń Baltic 
Teutonic Knights Baltic 
Order of the Faith and Peace France 
Militia of the Faith of Jesus Christ France 
Order of Aubrac France 
Hospitallers of Saint Thomas of 
Canterbury at Acre 
Holy Land/expanded 
Knights Hospitaller Holy Land/expanded 
Knights Templar Holy Land/expanded 
Order of Saint Lazarus Holy Land/expanded 
Order of Saint Maurice Holy Land/expanded 
Order of the Dragon Hungary 
Order of Saint Stephen Pope and Martyr Italy 
Militia of Jesus Christ Italy 
Order of the Blessed Virgin Mary Italy 
Order of Saint James of Altopascio Italy 
Order of Aviz Portugal 
Order of Saint Michael of the Wing Portugal 
Order of the Knights of Our Lord Jesus 
Christ 
Portugal 
Order of Alcántara Spain 
Order of Calatrava Spain 
Order of Monfragüe Spain 
Order of Montesa Spain 
Order of Mountjoy Spain 
Order of Santa María de España Spain 
Order of Santiago Spain 
Order of the Blessed Virgin Mary of 
Mercy 
Spain 
* France, Italy, and Spain refer to the modern boundaries of those countries, not their 
historic medieval ones. 
 
DECLINE OF EUROPEAN WARRIOR ELITES 
 
Military religious orders eventually declined in importance and necessity in 
Europe. Initially the orders complemented the king—they expanded Christian 
power and territory. In Iberia after the Reconquista, however, the orders became 
substitutes for the king as the warrior elites controlled vast territories. In northern 
Europe the Teutonic Knights became the government but were later defeated by 
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opposing forces. Knights returning from the Holy Land following defeats lost 
their main raison d’être, and travelling powerful warriors could be viewed as 
threatening to the king, leading to royal opposition (as happened with the Knights 
Templar). That is, while initially warrior elites complemented the king, over time 
they became substitutes and thus suppressed by the state after governments 
became sufficiently strong to combat them.  
To suppress the orders, some kings relaxed membership restrictions 
(Iannaccone 1992). As stated before, Iannaccone postulates that religious groups 
often impose restrictions on members that are outside of normal behavior. While 
perhaps irrational at first glance, such restrictions eliminate free riding in the 
group and leave only the strongest adherents. This practice allows these remaining 
members to have a higher level of worship within the group, as all are highly 
devoted. By relaxing membership the median member is not as pious, thereby 
weakening the system and leading to an erosion of power.  
As an example, the Order of Aviz in Portugal in its earliest form began in 
1146. Following the expulsion of the Moors, the order lost direction, but overseas 
expeditions gave it a new purpose with new crusades in northern Africa. These 
crusades soon ended, however, and the pope eliminated the order’s vow of 
celibacy in 1502. The order became secularized in 1789 and completely 
eliminated in 1834 (Moeller 1907).  
As orders became wealthier, they became a target for kings. The Order of 
Santiago de la Espada formed in 1171. The military order provided protection to 
pilgrims in Galicia. At its peak the order had two cities, 178 boroughs and 
villages, 200 parishes, five hospitals, five convents, and a university under its 
control and had possessions in Portugal, France, Italy, Hungary, and Palestine. In 
1499 King Ferdinand persuaded the pope to give him administrative power over 
the order. Charles V took even greater control over the order (along with 
Alcántara and Calatrava), which ended its autonomy (Moeller 1912).  
A different explanation for the decline of military orders can be given in 
Northian terms. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) describe the progression of 
institutions in three stages. The first is the primitive order in small bands of high-
violence societies. Natural states then arise, which use politics to regulate 
economies to create rents and control violence. Eventually the natural state can 
give way to open access orders, which expand property rights to the masses as 
opposed to the elites.  
The move from the natural state to open access orders is difficult, which North 
and colleagues explain in three steps. The first condition is for elites to extend 
property rights beyond themselves to a broader base. The next step is to allow 
more organizations, arising from the first step, to flourish. The final condition is 
the removal of military control from the elites. 
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In a natural state throughout the time of warrior elites, large tracts of land 
remained outside the power of European royalty. Lacking the capacity to establish 
their own armies, the elite expanded property rights to the religious orders to 
expand territory. Kings became more powerful, however, and viewed the orders 
as a threat. This recognition led the elites to scale back the power of the religious 
warriors to maintain institutions in a natural state. That is, the kings took the first 
step to move towards an open access system, then after their power expanded 
rescinded the step.  
Viewed another way, the success of the medieval military orders in protecting 
property rights and creating viable financial institutions encouraged growth and 
development of their host societies, leading in turn to the orders’ decline in 
importance. Focusing on religion’s role in economic growth and development, 
Kuran (2011) shows how key elements of Jewish and Christian doctrine helped 
the West beginning in the 11th century, parallel to the growth of the orders. The 
orders helped the West grow rich. Similarly, Blaydes and Paik (2016: 551) show 
how areas with more crusaders up to the year 1200 had better long-term economic 
growth: “areas with large numbers of Holy Land crusaders witnessed increased 
political stability and institutional development as well as greater urbanization 
associated with rising trade and capital accumulation.” 
Interestingly, over this time of diminishing military religious orders, the 
system of purchasing military posts and use of prizes increased (Allen, 2012: 
150–51). The venal post system dates to the 13th century but was more 
widespread after the 17th, shortly following the decline of our warrior elites. The 
rise of government armies due to the increasing strength of states leading to 
decreased necessity to rely on warrior monks is consistent with our theory.  
 
CASE STUDY: THE TEMPLARS (PERIOD OF INTEREST: 1119–1307 C.E.) 
 
The First Crusade culminated with the capture of Jerusalem in 1099. Christian 
control of Jerusalem in turn made the city more attractive to pilgrims and others 
traveling to the Holy Land. Although the city itself was relatively safe for 
Christians, the intervening travel route was not. Further, most of the crusading 
knights who captured Jerusalem had returned to their homes, leaving the city and 
Kingdom of Jerusalem with only minimum defense. Founded to protect the route 
to the Holy Land, the Templars’ mission expanded to include its defense (Forey, 
1992: 18–19). Later, and especially after the fall of the Holy Land, the order 
participated in the defense and reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula.   
The Templars initially received support for their efforts in the form of money 
and especially of estates donated by nobles concerned about keeping Jerusalem in 
Christian hands. Bernard of Clairvaux was an early benefactor who also promoted 
the Templars throughout medieval Europe. The order’s prosperity was assured 
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when Pope Honorius II endorsed it at the Council of Troyes in 1129 and when 
Pope Innocent II granted it exemption from temporal laws and taxes in 1139. 
Templars were a warrior elite. They were elite in part because they were few, 
numbering no more than several hundred in any region (Forey, 1992: 77–83). 
They were few in part because each one was very expensive to train and support. 
Each was heavily armed and armored and was trained to fight effectively on foot 
or on horseback. In the latter case, development of an effective stirrup and the 
breeding of heavy horses gave mounted knights tremendous striking power, 
especially against lightly armored cavalry or less disciplined infantry. Likely the 
most dramatic illustration of the Templars as warriors came at the Battle of 
Montgisard in 1177, where a force of perhaps 500 Templars and a few thousand 
supporting infantry crushed Saladin’s army of 26,000. Interestingly, Saladin’s 
battle losses included his personal bodyguard of Mamluks, another warrior elite. 
Templar numbers were limited as well by the order’s demands on its 
members. Members adopted a version of the Benedictine Rule including vows of 
poverty, chastity, and obedience:   
 
58. You who have abandoned the pleasant riches of this world, we believe you to 
have willingly subjected yourselves to poverty; therefore we are resolved that 
you who live the communal life may receive tithes.  
 
17. For if any brother does not take the vow of chastity he cannot come to eternal 
rest nor see God… 
 
1. We speak firstly to all those who secretly despise their own will and desire 
with a pure heart to serve the sovereign king as a knight and with studious care 
desire to wear, and wear permanently, the very noble armour of obedience (“The 
Primitive Rule of the Templars,” as cited in Upton-Ward 1992).  
 
Members of course were bound by the same standards as other Christians, and 
some of these standards clearly benefited society in ways significant here. The 
Ten Commandments, for example, included prohibitions on murder, theft, and 
dishonesty. It seems reasonable to presume members of the order were expected 
to adhere to these standards more strictly than the general population given the 
degree of their commitment to the faith.  
As mentioned, the order received significant donations of land and money 
directly to support defense of the Holy Land. Because of the vow of poverty, 
additional significant Templar income came from new members donating their 
wealth and estates. Further, nobles traveling to the Holy Land on pilgrimage or to 
fight allowed the order to manage land (and receive a portion of its income) while 
absent. Eventually more of the order’s members lived in Europe maintaining these 
estates than lived in the Holy Land. 
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Of special interest to our research is Templar financial and trade activity. The 
order built a chain of forts to protect the route to the Holy Land. To support these 
forts and its efforts in the Holy Land and to transport pilgrims, the order built and 
maintained a fleet and also engaged in significant international trade. The 
Templars became bankers, lending money to pilgrims and knights and even to 
kings, managing to circumvent the Christian prohibition on charging interest on 
loans.1 King Philip IV of France’s suppression of the order in 1307 was motivated 
in part by a desire to eliminate his debts to the Templars.2 Interestingly, Philip did 
not confiscate Templar estates, choosing instead to transfer them to the 
Hospitallers. 
The order created what might be the first example of a “debit card and ATM” 
system. Travelers to the Holy Land deposited cash at a Templar facility in Europe 
and received a letter of credit, possibly coded. The traveler redeemed part or all of 
the funds, less a fee, at Templar facilities en route or upon arrival. Not only did 
this practice reduce the risk of a traveler being robbed, it also eliminated the 
difficulty posed in an era before efficient currency markets enabled exchanging 
silver currency used in Europe with gold currency common in the Near East 
(Marvin 1989). 
The Knights Templar were an international banking, trade, and travel 
conglomerate. They became wealthy by providing valuable goods and services at 
relatively low cost. Their cost advantage came in part from their temporal tax 
exemption but also from their ability to cross national boundaries freely and from 
the low cost of uncertainty about the reliability of their services. 
This latter point tends not to be acknowledged. Financial markets were in their 
infancy, and especially in the area of banking, widespread institutions protecting 
participants from opportunistic behavior had not evolved. The unique character of 
the Templars with their code and religious beliefs assured product quality. As 
mentioned, it was their very success at banking that made them King Philip’s 
target. It might even be argued that the order’s suppression and the decision by 
other orders to discontinue banking and financial activities set back European 
progress in this area. 
 
  
                                                
1 Interest was paid, but not always directly as such. If a farm was used as collateral for a loan, the 
knights had claim to the revenue stream from the property and would collect it until the principal 
was repaid. The stream of payments from the land functioned as interest even if not labeled as 
such (Stark, 2009: 113, 177). 
2 Jews, another lending group, had been expelled the prior year.  
Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion  Vol. 13 (2017), Article 5 12 
CASE STUDY: THE HOSPITALLERS (PERIOD OF INTEREST: 1113 TO 1565 
C.E.) 
 
The story of the Hospitallers is similar to that of the Templars but with a 
different emphasis. The Order of Hospitallers, or Knights Hospitaller, began as a 
group of men supporting a hospital in Jerusalem intended to aid Christian 
pilgrims. After Christians captured Jerusalem in the First Crusade, the 
Hospitallers organized as warrior monks under the Benedictine Rule and were 
confirmed as such by Pope Paschal II in 1113. The Hospitallers defended the 
Holy Land, along with the other holy orders, until Muslim forces reconquered 
Jerusalem and other regions of the Holy Land. The order then established itself on 
the Iberian Peninsula and on Rhodes and then on Malta, defending against 
Muslim advances from the east and into the Iberian Peninsula. The successful 
defense of Malta against the Ottoman leader Suleiman in 1565 was the last time 
members of the order fought as armed knights. The order then changed its 
(increasingly modest) focus to efforts against the Ottoman-sponsored Barbary 
pirates. 
The Hospitallers engaged in trade, banking, and finance activities, as did the 
Templars, but on a more modest scale. Land as a source of wealth was always 
more important to the Hospitallers than to the Templars, and of course Hospitaller 
holdings increased significantly after the Templars’ suppression. The order had 
estates (commanderies) in Portugal, Spain, Italy, England, Ireland, Germany, 
Eastern Europe, and as many as 250 commanderies in what is now France (Sire 
1994). The holdings mainly consisted of agricultural estates but also included 
hospitals for the sick, facilities for travelers, villages, and convents. 
Consistent with this paper’s hypothesis, the Hospitallers managed their assets 
responsibly, with an eye to long-run benefits. In 1296 Master Vissaret in granting 
a charter of independence to the village of Le Burgaud stated, “The more the town 
grows in consequence of the liberties accorded the inhabitants, the more the house 
of St John also will prosper” (Sire, 1994: 107). When he took possession of the 
commandery in Cours in 1459, Fortanier de Lat took a formal oath to protect the 
vassals: “That he will be to them a good lord and legal and will guard their right 
and their liberties and their usages and will guard them from wrong and from 
force of his own and of others of his legal power” (Sire, 1994: 107–8, trans. from 
French original by authors). French commanderies prospered even until the 
French Revolution, during which time they were confiscated. Commanderies in 
other nations lasted even longer. The order also maintained roads and bridges in 
their holdings. They were active in reclaiming and attracting settlers to wild lands 
in southern France and in Germany. The fact that vassals tended to move away 
from exploitive estates and toward prosperous ones is an endorsement of the 
order’s policies (Bloch 1961). 
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Not only did the Hospitallers benefit from exemption from temporal taxes, but 
the order’s beliefs and practices further enhanced land values. Having taken a 
vow of poverty, the inclination of individual members to exploit land holdings for 
personal benefit was attenuated.   
 
CASE STUDY: THE ORDER OF CALATRAVA (PERIOD OF INTEREST: 1100s 
TO 1487 C.E.) 
 
This 12th century Cistercian military order was founded in Castile to fight the 
Muslims. Alfonso VII, the king of Castile, took the castle Calatrava from the 
Moors in 1147. Located on the southern edge of the kingdom, the king struggled 
to maintain possession. The Knights Templar were defeated, and a new military 
order began in Calatrava’s defense as the king had no standing army of his own.  
Various vows bound the knights: silence in the refectory, dormitory, and 
oratory; specific fasts throughout the year; paternoster recitations; requirements to 
sleep in their armor; and others. In addition, there were vows of poverty and 
celibacy.  
Over time the order grew; it acted as the feudal lord over thousands of 
peasants and had upwards of 2,000 knights—a large force for the time. This 
power became a threat to the monarch, Pedro the Cruel, who put to death three 
consecutive Grand Masters of the order, including one the king killed himself. As 
the Muslims were defeated, the order turned on itself with divisions and rivalries.  
The order, however, corrected itself and reached its height of prosperity in the 
second half of the 15th century. It had control over more than sixty villages with a 
combined population of 200,000 and large annual revenues. Kings again felt 
threatened by this rival institution with vast riches and power. Instead of 
murdering the Grand Masters as before, King Ferdinand of Aragon through a 
papal bull in 1487 ended political autonomy of the order. The order slowly lost its 
power, the vows of celibacy and poverty were later eliminated (Iannaccone 1992), 
and the order dissolved completely in 1838 (Moeller 1908).  
 
CASE STUDY: THE SAMURAI (PERIOD OF INTEREST: 1100s TO 1603 C.E.) 
 
Warrior elites existed outside of Europe, the samurai being one example. The 
definition of the term samurai is somewhat imprecise. In use among historians, a 
samurai is “a lightly armored mounted archer characteristic of Japan after 1100” 
(Farris, 1992: 1). The term samurai means literally “one who serves” and can also 
refer to a person occupying the Sixth Court Rank who served a person of higher 
rank (one of the first five court ranks). A person occupying the Sixth Court Rank 
need not have been a warrior, however, nor did all warriors serve in the court. 
Before and even after the term samurai entered common usage, these specialized 
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warriors were typically called bushi. Not all samurai rode horses, nor did they rely 
on the bow. 
Japan’s Heian period, roughly 794 to 1100, was characterized by a 
bureaucratic central government similar to China’s. Heian refers to Japan’s 
capital city during the period: Heian-kyō, or modern Kyōto. Of interest to this 
paper, military technology evolved during the Heian period. At its start, the 
imperial army consisted mainly of relatively poorly trained and equipped mass 
peasant militia. Over time, mounted archers became more common and eventually 
completely replaced the peasants as fighters (Friday 1992). Well-trained mounted 
horse archers could literally run rings around foot soldiers and kill them at ranges 
that posed little risk to the archers. As with Europe’s mounted knights, 
innovations in saddles and stirrups complemented this new method of warfare. 
But, as in the case of the Templars and other knightly orders, an effective 
mounted fighter required specialized skills and training and expensive equipment. 
Instead of recruiting them from the peasantry, the emperor hired bushi as needed 
from the lower nobility in the capital as well as from the provinces. The lower 
nobility were relatively wealthy and had time available for training.   
At the end of the Heian period, the bushi began to employ their unique 
military power to acquire political power, culminating in 1185, when Minamoto 
no Yoritomo seized significant imperial powers and gave himself the title Shogun. 
Although the emperor remained Japan’s nominal leader, bushi maintained 
practical control of the central government until the latter 1860s.   
Establishment of the Shogunate gave samurai control of the central 
government but did not assure the central government’s control of Japan. In fact, 
the power of the central government began a 500-year decline, sometimes labeled 
Japan’s Medieval Period (Adolphson and Ramseyer 2009). Warfare between local 
leaders, which had occurred before, became more serious, culminating in a full-
scale civil war from 1467 to 1573. Local leaders kept samurai on permanent 
retainer and hired others as needed. Samurai in turn benefited to the extent they 
could align themselves with a successful leader, and those alignments could and 
did change. 
What role did religion play in a samurai’s life? Did the samurai adopt a unique 
religion? Interestingly, new forms of Buddhism came to Japan at the beginning of 
the Medieval Period. While much of the population adopted Pure Land 
Buddhism, the samurai tended to choose Zen Buddhism. This pattern, at least, is 
consistent with our hypothesis.   
As adopted by the samurai, Zen Buddhism did not encourage behavior 
conducive to property rights enforcement, however. Not just Buddhist doctrine 
but samurai teachings in general tended to focus on loyalty to the leader and 
fearlessness in battle (Wilson, 1982: 33): “When one is serving officially or in the 
master’s court, he should not think of a hundred or a thousand people, but should 
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only consider the importance of the master. Nor should he draw the line at his 
own life or anything else he considers valuable” (Hojo Shigetoki, “The Message 
of Master Gokurakuji,” [1256], as cited in Wilson, 1982: 38). 
So the interesting question is whether or not Medieval Japan can be 
considered a successful society. If Japan during this time was successful or was 
creating successful institutions, samurai doctrine is not consistent with this 
paper’s hypothesis. To the extent Japan’s Medieval Period can be regarded a 
failed society, however, the paper’s hypothesis is supported. That is, the society 
was a failure in part because the samurai did not adopt a religious doctrine useful 
to society.   
One perspective comes from work by Adolphson and Ramseyer (2009). These 
authors argue that the Medieval Japanese government, supported by the samurai, 
largely failed. They further argue that Buddhist temples and monasteries became 
substitute enforcers of property rights: “By helping to secure basic claims to 
property, the temples and monasteries helped to promote investment and growth; 
by competing against the government itself, they helped to forestall the crippling 
effect of a predatory monopolistic state” (Adolphson and Ramseyer, 2009: 660). 
In other words, religion did play a role in enforcing property rights in Medieval 
Japan, but the instrument of that enforcement was the church, not a warrior elite. 
This conclusion does not contradict our more general view of religion’s role in 
preindustrial societies. 
Historians date the end of Japan’s Medieval Period as 1603 when Tokugawa 
Ieyasu unified Japan and established himself as shogun. The Tokugawa 
Shogunate endured until it was abolished in 1867 during the Meiji Restoration. 
The Tokugawa period was peaceful, stable, and rigid, perhaps in its later years 
more accurately described as ossified. The powerful central government 
successfully ended warfare between estates and generally neutralized the samurai 
as active warriors. As the era progressed, samurai became more or less wards of 
the state or petty bureaucrats (Yamamura 1971). 
 
CASE STUDY: THE JANISSARIES (PERIOD OF INTEREST: LATE 1300s TO 
1826) 
 
Founded in about 1300, the Ottoman Empire ultimately encompassed the 
western Mediterranean region, the entire Middle East, and Egypt (Goodwin 
1998). It eventually declined, evolving into the nation of Turkey in the early 
1900s. During much of its existence, the empire’s leader or sultan employed a 
class of elite infantry warriors called Janissaries, the term meaning “new troop.” 
The Janissaries typically constituted about 10 percent the Ottoman army’s 
numbers. 
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Formed after about 1383 by Murad I, the Janissaries were first recruited from 
prisoners of war and slaves and not long after from Christian boys in the Balkan 
territories of the empire given as an alternative to taxes. Behavior standards were 
strict and included celibacy. A recruit did not formally enter the ranks until age 
twenty-five and then only after proving worthy. The Janissaries adopted (or were 
forced to adopt) Bektashism, a sect in the Islamic Sufi tradition founded by Hajji 
Bektash Wali expressly for the Janissaries under orders from Sultan Murad II. 
The sect borrowed significant rituals from Christianity. Interestingly given that 
recruitment was from youth, higher ranked individuals in the sect were called 
baba (father) and dede (grandfather). 
Although certainly elite warriors, the Janissaries are not a warrior elite as 
defined in this paper. Until after the late 1500s, they exercised no political power. 
Further, given their loyalty and attachment to the sultan, they served to protect 
property rights only to the extent this task was the sultan’s objective. But the 
sultans tended not to impose themselves on conquered regions, leaving a fairly 
loose administration whose main objective was to levy taxes and tribute. Who 
provided a legal structure? “Charismatic sects, chivalric orders, brotherhoods, and 
guilds imposed codes of behavior which maintained a kind of order in areas 
where authority such as Osman’s was weak” (Goodwin, 1998: 9). Note again 
religion’s enforcement role.   
The late 1500s saw the beginning of three trends. First, recruitment and 
requirements became more lax. The celibacy rule was relaxed in 1566, volunteers 
were accepted, and Muslims from within the empire joined the ranks. Recruits 
eventually also came from the children of Janissaries with little restriction or 
training.  
Second, and following from the first, the military effectiveness of the 
Janissaries declined. They had been military innovators, being early adopters of 
the musket, for example. But over time innovation ceased. Their suppression 
came in part because they objected to the sultan forming newer units based on 
Western models. 
Third, at the peak of their military power, they began to make increasing 
demands on the sultan. These demands began with simple extortion: striking for 
higher wages. Eventually the Janissaries staged palace coups to install malleable 
sultans. They became landholders and business owners. Eventually they 
dominated Ottoman politics. Thus they became an elite, but were not warriors. 
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MODERN WARRIOR ELITES 
 
While our focus is historical, our hypothesis can be generalized to modern 
versions of warrior elites. Gangs in the United States are associated with violence, 
with popular thought being that gangs cause crime. Sobel and Osoba (2009) 
demonstrate the opposite, however: crime causes gangs (at least for Los Angeles 
over their time of study). Their approach is similar to ours. When crime 
increases—or there is a decline in the stability of property rights—residents seek 
to protect themselves. One mechanism of property protection is to join a gang, 
which can be viewed as a privatized government. Gang members have initiation 
rituals and pledges, as did warrior monks, to deal with adverse selection. 
Religious orders extended property rights for the kings where their power was 
weak, whereas gangs protect property rights of individuals where the government 
is weak (see also Skarbek [2014] on Californian prison gangs). 
Likewise the mafia in Sicily can be interpreted as a form of modern warrior 
elites who protect property rights. Buonanno et al. (2011: 1) argue that following 
“the demise of Sicilian feudalism, the lack of publicly provided property-right 
protection from widespread banditry favored the development of a florid market 
for private protection and the emergence of a cartel of protection providers: the 
mafia.” The Freemasons, among other groups, provided the Mafiosi with rituals 
and organization. Along similar lines Dimico, Isopi, and Olsson (2012) argue the 
mafia arose as a non-governmental institution to protect property rights within the 
unique market structure of Sicily. These studies coincide with the famous Mafioso 
Calogero Vizzini assertion: “The fact is that in every society there has to be a 
category of people who straighten things out when situations get complicated. 
Usually they are functionaries of the state. Where the state is not present, or where 
it does not have sufficient force, this is done by private individuals” (as cited in 
Friedman and McNeill, 2013: 180). An interesting question beyond the scope of 
this paper is the extent and character of mafia member religious belief. 
There are obvious differences between warrior monks and gang members. 
Initial warrior elites were sanctioned by the state and acted under the banner of 
God and king, whereas government opposes gangs and the mafia. Yet both 
modern and historic warrior elites filled a void of weak property rights, use 




This preliminary analysis of warrior elites shows at least some support for the 
hypothesis that they adopt unique religious doctrines of value in protecting 
property rights. Clearly the Templars, the Hospitallers and the Order of Calatrava 
did so, and other orders likewise filled a property rights void.  
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But outside of Western Europe, our results are weaker. Although the samurai 
adopted a unique religion and were certainly elite warriors, their actions during 
much of the period of interest did little to help their host society. On the other 
hand, to the extent medieval Japan’s economy failed to achieve its potential, the 
samurai’s failure to protect property rights is a useful counter-factual. In addition, 
the role Buddhist monasteries and temples substituted for the government (and the 
samurai) provides some support to our general theory of religion. 
By our definition the Janissaries in their early history were elite warriors but 
not a warrior elite. In their later history, they were an elite but not warriors. We 
suspect other examples in this same mold might include Rome’s Praetorian 
Guard. Unlike the Templars and Hospitallers but like the samurai and Janissaries, 
the Praetorians operated as agents of the emperor within relatively unified 
empires. In their ascendency, however, Praetorians did not adopt a unique 
religious doctrine (Bingham 2013). 
Significant additional research is obviously required. Additional warrior elites 
should be analyzed; examples include the Mamluks, the Immortals, and the czar’s 
Streltsy soldiers. Furthermore, our current case studies present only a cursory 
examination of the warriors and their context. As an additional issue, these 
warrior elites existed in roughly the same historic period and might be a response 
to the extant military technology, as might the cause of their demise: the 
increasing power of central government and effective weapons usable by mass 
armies that required discipline but not skill. Further study into how military elites, 
especially in Europe, directly improved institutional development could be a 
fertile area of research. Another possible question is if the different European 
warrior elites led to varying long-term outcomes based on the institutional set up 
of the military order.  Nevertheless, we feel this first effort provides an interesting 




Adolphson, Mikael, and J. Mark Ramseyer. 2009. “The Competitive Enforcement of 
Property Rights in Medieval Japan: The Role of Temples and Monasteries.” Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization 71(3): 660–68. 
Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1973. “The Property Rights Paradigm.” 
Journal of Economic History 33(1): 16–27. 
Allen, Douglas W. 1995. “Order in the Church: A Property Rights Approach.” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 27(1): 97–117. 
Allen, Douglas W. 2012. The Institutional Revolution: Measurement and the Economic 
Emergence of the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Anderson, Gary M., Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., Robert F. Hébert, and Robert D. Tollison. 
1992. “An Economic Interpretation of the Medieval Crusades.” Journal of European 
Economic History 21(2): 339–64. 
Anderson and Hull: “Religion, Warrior Elites, and Property Rights” 19 
 
Bingham, Sandra. 2013. The Praetorian Guard. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press. 
Blaydes, Lisa, and Christopher Paik. 2016. “The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State 
Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in 
Medieval Europe.” International Organization 70: 551–86. 
Bloch, Marc. 1961. Feudal Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Buonanno, Paolo, Ruben Durante, Giovanni Prarolo, and Paolo Vanin. 2011. “On the 
Historical and Geographic Origins of the Sicilian Mafia.” Working Paper. 
Church, Jeffrey, and Neil Gandal. 1992. “Network Effects, Software Provision, and 
Standardization.” Journal of Industrial Economics 40(1): 85–103. 
Clegg, Nancy W., and Clyde G. Reed. 1994. “The Economic Decline of the Church in 
Medieval England.” Explorations in Economic History 31(2): 261–80. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm.” Economica 4: 386–405. 
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. “Toward a Theory of Property Rights.” American Economic 
Review 57(2): 347–59. 
Dimico, Arcangelo, Alessia Isopi, and Ola Olsson. 2012. “Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: 
The Market for Lemons.” Working Paper.  
Ekelund, Robert B., Robert F. Hébert, Robert D. Tollison, Gary M. Anderson, and 
Audrey B. Davidson. 1996. Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic 
Firm. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Farris, William Wayne. 1992. Heavenly Warriors: The Evolution of Japan’s Military, 
500–1300. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Forey, Alan. 1992. The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth 
Centuries. London: MacMillan Education Limited. 
Friday, Karl F. 1992. Hired Swords: The Rise of Private Warrior Power in Early Japan. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Friedman, Daniel, and Daniel McNeill. 2013. Morals and Markets: The Dangerous 
Balance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. Trust: The 
Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: The Free Press. 
Goodwin, James. 1998. Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire. New 
York: Henry Holt and Company. 
Greif, Avner. 1989. “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the 
Maghribi Traders.” Journal of Economic History 49(4): 857–82. 
Greif, Avner. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: 
The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.” American Economic Review 83(3): 525–48. 
Hull, Brooks B. 1989. “Religion, Afterlife, and Property Rights in the High Middle 
Ages.” Studies in Economic Analysis 12(1): 3–21. 
Hull, Brooks B., and Frederick Bold. 1989. “Towards an Economic Theory of the 
Church.” International Journal of Social Economics 16(6): 5–15. 
Hull, Brooks B., and Frederick Bold. 1994. “Hell, Religion, and Cultural Change.” 
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150(3): 447–64. 
Iannaccone, Laurence R. 1992. “Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-Riding in Cults, 
Communes, and Other Collectives.” Journal of Political Economy 100 (2): 271–91. 
Kuran, Timur. 2011. The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle 
East. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Leeson, Peter. 2012. “Ordeals.” Journal of Law and Economics 55(3): 691–714. 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion  Vol. 13 (2017), Article 5 20 
Marvin, Lawrence W. 1989. “Bankers in Armor: A Financial History of the Knights 
Templar.” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY. 
Menard, Claude E., ed., 1997. Transaction Cost Economics: Some Recent Developments. 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar. 
Moeller, Charles. 1907. “Order of Aviz.” In The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 2. New 
York: Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved August 14, 2015 from 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02161d.htm. 
Moeller, Charles. 1908. “Military Order of Calatrava.” In The Catholic Encyclopedia, 
Vol. 3. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved May 2014 from 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03149d.htm. 
Moeller, Charles. 1912. “Order of Saint James of Compostela.” In The Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. 13. New York: Robert Appleton Company. Retrieved August 14, 
2015 from http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13353a.htm. 
Morton, Nicholas Edward. 2013. The Medieval Military Orders: 1120–1314. London: 
Routledge. 
North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and 
Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sire, H. J. A. 1994. The Knights of Malta. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Skarbek, David. 2014. The Social Order of the Underworld: How Prison Gangs Govern 
the American Penal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sobel, Russell S., and Brian J. Osoba. 2009. “Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments: 
Implications for Violent Crime.” Southern Economic Journal 75(4): 996–1018. 
Stark, Rodney. 2009. God’s Battalions: The Case for the Crusades. New York: 
HarperOne. 
Stark, Rodney, and William Sims Bainbridge. 1987. A Theory of Religion. New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. 
Upton-Ward, J. M., trans. 1992. The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule 
of the Order of the Knights Templar. Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press. 
Wilson, William Scott, trans. and ed. 1982. Ideals of the Samurai. Santa Clarita, CA: 
Ohara Publications. 
Yamamura, Kozo. 1971. “The Increasing Poverty of the Samurai in Tokugawa Japan, 
1600–1868.” Journal of Economic History 31(2): 378–406. 
 
